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A CONSERVATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE FUTURE OF
THE AMERICAN JURY TRIAL
ROBERT P. BURNS*
INTRODUCTION
I want to defend here an essentially conservative vision of the
American jury trial. This Essay is written in the spirit of the key
conservative insight-how much effort it takes to keep things from
getting worse. My conviction is that the American jury trial, as we
have developed it, is one of the greatest achievements of American
public culture. It is a mature institution surrounded by a constellation
of rules and practices that are ideally suited to accomplish what for us
is justice in tens of thousands of situations every year. It succeeds
because of the almost unbearable tension of opposites that it creates.
It should be understood and appreciated before it is "reformed."
Many of the proposed reforms of the jury trial are consistent
with a narrow understanding of the place of the jury trial in American
public life that I call the "received view" of the trial. Some such
reforms are fair enough, but often do not go to the heart of the
matter. Once one appreciates the subtlety and depth of which the
American trial is now capable, proposing reforms becomes a much
more challenging task. I will very tentatively offer a few possibilities.
I will also sketch out the structural and intellectual bases of the
ongoing pressure on the American trial. I am unsure about the extent
to which they will prevail in the ensuing decades. Because I believe
that there are few public inevitabilities, that political imagination and
will can resist strong pressures, I believe that, on the matter of the
future of the American jury trial, pessimists are cowards and opti-
mists are fools.
First, a theoretical point. I will argue here that the assumptions
about the nature of the American jury trial that animate at least some
reformers are wrong. What does it mean for an assumption about a
set of public practices and institutions to be "wrong?" One can show
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
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that they are inconsistent with much of what we do and have done,
practices that are appropriate candidates for what philosopher John
Rawls calls "considered judgments" of justice,' institutionalized
judgments made under favorable conditions in which those who are
best suited to know have a high level of confidence. The conservative
insight suggests that we ought to be wary of the spirit of abstraction,
an ideological temper that reduces complex and subtle practices to
one or two simple ideas. But that is not the end of the matter. The
very possibility of reform of public institutions, including those that
Rawls proposes, assumes the possibility that what we actually do may
be inconsistent with the ideals that should control and structure those
institutions. The relationship between practices and ideals is a
circular one, in which each may be refined by comparison with the
other, to arrive at a position that Rawls calls "reflective equilibrium,"
the position in which there is at least temporary peace between
practices and ideals. This calls for political judgment of a form that
parallels on the level of institutions the kind of judgment that the trial
itself is often able to achieve at the level of individual cases. A
position on what the trial should be can only be justified by "the
mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together
into one coherent view."'2  After our more theoretical self-
understandings are tutored by our practices, and those practices
reconsidered in light of our understandings, we are in a position to
give the best interpretation of the American trial. As Clifford Geertz
consistently maintained, it is by cycling between the most detailed
descriptions of institutionalized practices and the broadest generaliza-
tions that we are likely to achieve real insight into both those prac-
tices and our more general ideas.' The task of understanding the trial
is an interpretive task and it "is partly evaluative, since it consists in
the identification of the principles which both best 'fit' or cohere with
the settled law and legal practices of a legal system and also provide
the best moral justification for them, thus showing the law 'in its best
light." 4
1. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 47 (1971).
2. Id. at 579.
3. Clifford Geertz, From the Native's Point of View: On the Nature of Anthropological
Understanding, in INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE 239 (Paul Rabinow & William M. Sullivan
eds., 1979).
4. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 239-41 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis added) (quoting




I. THE RECEIVED VIEW OF THE TRIAL
What I call the "received view" of the trial understands it exclu-
sively as the institutionalized device for the maintenance of the rule
of law in situations where there are disputes of fact. The rule of law is
understood in Justice Scalia's sense as a "law of rules,"5 pre-existent
commands that assign determinate consequences to determinate
classes of events. The primary political good of law so conceived is
the enhancement of citizen autonomy-the citizen always knows
where the lines are and can always control how he may avoid the
intrusion of the coercive power of the state into his pursuit of happi-
ness. This is an important political value. Furthermore, it explains
and can be brought into reflective equilibrium with a range of actual
trial practices.
Speaking broadly, the received view understands the jury to be
engaged in two practices, distinct from one another and in sequence.
First, it must create from inevitably circumstantial evidence, through
the mediation of purely empirical common-sense generalizations, an
accurate and value-free narrative of what occurred. It must be
accurate, because the rule of law will not prevail if citizens are pun-
ished or otherwise suffer the effects of the coercive power of the state
when they have not in fact done what they are "accused" of doing.
This would be true whether the officials deliberately misrepresent the
underlying facts or whether they were simply incapable of determin-
ing what actually occurred. The account not only must be accurate,
but also must be value-free. If the account of what occurred was
infected by norms that came from the jury's normative common sense
or sensibility, then there would not be assurance that the case was
actually being decided based exclusively on the legitimate norms
found in the jury instructions.
After constructing a value-free account of what occurred, the
jury must perform what we can call an act of fair characterization.
The jury must decide whether or not the factual account that it has
constructed, with the help of counsel, from the circumstantial evi-
dence falls within or without the classes defined by the rules to be
found in the jury instructions that reflect the elements of the claims,
crimes, or defenses. The closer this operation comes to a deduction
the better, and this notion is
5. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1187
(1989).
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often thought to imply, further, that there are rules and procedures
of inference according to which the features of the various concepts
and the characteristics of various particular things are juxtaposed to
one another so that certain features can be said to correspond to
certain characteristics and not to others. 6
Finally, the verdict occurs as the result of what we might call an
act of conceptual "inspection," by which the jury determines whether
or not it has categorized the value-free account of what has occurred
within the classes defined by the instructions. Thus, in the received
view of the trial, the only rules or concepts linking the facts of the
individual case and the verdict are the value-free empirical generali-
zations that allow the construction of the value-free account and the
legitimate legal categories on the other.
The power of the received view stems not only from its connec-
tion with basic values of the liberal state, but also from its coherence
with a range of the most distinctive features of the American trial. It
is consistent with the availability of a range of summary procedures in
civil cases (though not with the absence of most of those procedures
in criminal cases), the doctrine of materiality in evidence law, a whole
range of other evidentiary doctrines that seek to ensure reliability, the
availability of judgments as a matter of law after trial (though, again,
not against the defendant in criminal cases), the use of jury instruc-
tions, and the strong preference for testimony in the language of
perception. The law of rules has an important place in the structure
of American trial practices. I will argue below, however, that to
understand the American trial solely in these terms is to commit the
fallacy of misplaced concreteness, to assume that important rules or
aspects of the trial exhaust its concrete reality. To understand the
trial solely in the language of the received view is to impoverish our
interpretation of the trial. To act as if the trial were equivalent to the
rules and practices that stem from this understanding would be to
return at the trial level to a species of mechanical jurisprudence.
Many suggestions for reform of the American jury trial are at-
tempts to shore up this vision of the trial. For example, there have
been suggestions and actual steps taken to expand the use of sum-
mary disposition,7 to read the jury instructions at the beginning of the
6. PETER J. STEINBERGER, THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL JUDGMENT 92 (1993).
7. Judge Patricia Wald has warned of the danger of the impoverishment of legal discourse
through overuse of the summary judgment device:
And one must at least think about the implications of the new regime, in which law is
mostly made on the basis of undisputed facts "pleaded." "stipulated," or "inferred"
rather than on fuller trial records that may more accurately represent the complexity
[Vol 78:1319
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trial, to rewrite the instructions so that they are more comprehensi-
ble,8 to limit what lawyers may say in opening statement, and to
enhance the judge's "gatekeeper" function for scientific and nonsci-
entific expert testimony.9 Some of these suggestions and develop-
ments are benign, but others pose a threat to deeper levels of the trial
which are essential if it is to remain, as it ought to, "the central
institution of law as we know it."'1 To understand why, I need to
sketch out this fuller understanding of the trial.
II. A LINGUISTIC PHENOMENOLOGY OF TRIAL PRACTICES
I have argued recently that the trial is for us a central practice
brilliantly adapted to our political situation.1 To understand this, it is
necessary actually to see what we are doing at trial, to examine the
complex of constitutive rules and practices that the trial comprises.
What the trial does, and what the rules of the trial help it to do, is to
actualize the common sense of the jury under the "discipline of the
evidence""2 to make a practical decision. Those rules and practices
give the jury access to moral, political, and legal sources. Ultimately,
the jury must make a choice about what dimension of the case is the
most important. But that decision is not made en grosse or abstractly.
Indeed, it is the nature of decent society to deny that such a practical
decision could ever be made in the same way for all situations.
In preparing for trial, lawyers seek to identify a legal theory of
the case, a factual theory of the case, and a theme, or persuasive
theory of the case. The legal theory will allow the attorney to resist a
and ambiguity of life. Will our law be less sensitive to the multivalenced and perspec-
tival qualities of human events? Will our jurisprudence craft rules and principles and
hand them down fully formed from the netherworld of law school hypotheticals, in-
stead of forging them in the heat of pitched battle and hammering them into shape on
the anvil of trials, witnesses, cross-examinations, and live evidence evaluated by ordi-
nary lay persons?
If Oliver Wendell Holmes was right when he said that "[tihe life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience," then the decoupling of law from experience could
strike a mortal blow to its integrity; our law would not disappear, but could become
lifeless, like a whale washed up on the beach.
Patricia Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1942, 1944 (1998) (citation
omitted).
8. Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1374 (1979).
9. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702, 703; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993).
10. JAMES BOYD WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE 108 (1999).
11. ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL (1999).
12. JEFFERY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 162 (1994)
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motion for a directed verdict and provide some benchmark for
determinations of materiality throughout the trial. It will provide
argumentative resources in closing argument based on the jury
instructions. In some cases, perhaps cases where there was a signifi-
cant reliance interest, a lawyer will be able to argue persuasively that
the most important aspect of the case is the enforcement of the clear
legal rules. But the legal rules provide only one helix in what is a
double helix of norms out of which the lawyer builds her case. The
other helix is constituted by the interrelation of theme and theory of
the case. The theme is the moral-political claim the case makes on
the jury's sensibilities. In an earlier idiom, it suggests to the jury what
is "true law," that is, the interpretation and application of law in the
dense complexity of this particular factual situation that best expresses
the moral sensibilities of the community. In the language of the
interpretive turn in jurisprudence, it tells the jury what they should
see this case "as." When lawyers in opening statements begin by
saying, "This is a case about... ," they are seeking the inspired
simplification that will ring true throughout the case and so win the
battle for the jury's imagination. This theme will be found explicitly
in the narrative of opening statements and then implicitly throughout
the trial. The first rule of trial procedure with regard to opening
statements is that lawyers may not "argue." But a good opening
statement will always contain an "argument" in the same way that a
novel or a short story contains an argument. It is carried by the
descriptions, inclusions, exclusions, and sequencing of the narrative.
The significance of these choices can never be exhausted by their
relationships to the rules in the jury instructions. 13 The openness of
the narrative of opening statements to reference to all of the moral
resources of the culture helps keep the law from ossifying into an
artificial bureaucratic instrument for the assertion of state power.
The law of professional responsibility mandates that the client
set the objectives of the representation. 14 However, the same law
13. GEORGE STEINER, REAL PRESENCES 82-83 (1989):
A sentence always means more. Even a single word, within the weave of incommen-
surable connotation, can, and usually does. The informing matrix or context of even a
rudimentary, literal proposition-and just what does literal mean?-moves outward
from specific utterance or notation in every-widening concentric and overlapping
circles. These comprise the individual, subconsciously quickened language habits and
associative field-mappings of the particular speaker or writer.... No formalization is
of an order adequate to the semantic mass and motion of a culture, to the wealth of
denotation, connotation, implicit reference, elision, and tonal register which envelop
saying what one means, meaning what one says or neither.
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2001).
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provides that a lawyer may not allude to matter at trial, including
during opening statement, of which there will not be admissible
evidence. 5 Thus, the story that the lawyer tells is the one that accom-
plishes the client's objectives, but is limited and mediated by factual
truth, those things that cannot be changed at will, and by the law of
rules as expressed in the doctrine of materiality. As John Dewey put
it approvingly, the lawyer in developing his theme and factual theory
of the case follows an "experimental and flexible logic" that is "rela-
tive to consequences rather than to antecedents." 16 (That the lawyers
for the parties tell these stories assures that there will not be "One
Big Story" decided upon by a state official.) But those consequences
are not merely client wishes, they are wishes that have been brought
into some equilibrium with the written law, the common sense, and
the public identity of the jury. It is an "equilibrium" because the
client's objectives will change in and through the process of counsel-
ing in the long shadow of the anticipated trial, and the case presented
by the lawyer will be designed to show that the client's objectives are
morally, legally, and politically consistent with those multiple sources
of norms.17
Opening statements are expressions of "trial diplomacy." As
such they are determined by the multiple and often incommensurable
norms of their audiences. And, of course, there are two opening
statements. The doubling of opening statements dramatizes the
inevitable gap between the truth and the telling of it. That doubling
prepares the jury for the major part of the trial, the presentation of
evidence. The bulk of the evidence comes through the testimony of
witnesses who will generally not be diplomats. They will tell their
stories as they remember them, memories inevitably shaped by their
own personal interpretations of what occurred. The basic rules of
14. Id. R. 3.4(e).
16. John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 26-27 (1924).
17. As one philosopher put it:
Drawn into public life by personal need, fear, ambition, and interest, we are there
forced to acknowledge the power of others and appeal to their standards. We are
forced to find or create a common language of purposes and aspirations, not merely to
clothe our private outlook in public disguise, but to become aware ourselves of its
public meaning. We are forced, as Joseph Tussman has put it, to transform "I want"
into "I am entitled to," a claim that becomes negotiable by public standards. In the
process we learn to think about the standards themselves, about our stake in the exis-
tence of standards, or justice, or our community, even of our opponents and enemies in
the community; so that afterwards we are changed.
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, in HANNAH ARENDT, CRITICAL
ESSAYS 261,282 (Louis P. Hinchman & Sandra K. Hinchman eds., 1994).
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direct examination exaggerate this productive discontinuity between
opening statements and witness testimony. Witnesses must testify on
direct examination in response to nonleading questions and in the
language of perception. They will be choosing the words in which to
testify, something that reveals who they are in a way that so-called
"character evidence" would rarely approach. More importantly, this
discontinuity between openings and testimony in even the best-
prepared case tells the jury that their task will require real judgment,
that the relationship between the norms they embrace and the facts of
the individual case are as yet unclear, that that relationship is worth
thinking, even fighting, 8 about. It provides the basis for the clarifica-
tion of both our more general norms and the facts of the individual
case.
Cross-examination provides perhaps the clearest example of a
central aspect of the trial as a whole. The trial proceeds through the
construction and deconstruction of narratives. Narratives contain the
potential meanings of events proposed by the parties (in openings)
and by witnesses (in direct examination). The deconstructive aspects
of the trial break these proposed meanings down-criticize them.
Perhaps the philosophical term "critique" is more apt. For the
deconstructive aspects of the trial generally suggest that the potential
meanings of events proposed in narratives are inapt, inappropriate for
the particular facts of this particular case. We have already seen that
the distinctive narrative style of direct examination already suggests
that the proposed interpretations of the opening statements, what the
lawyers propose the jury see the case "as" ("This is a case about...")
are likely to be somewhat overblown and overgeneral. This same
critical acid is applied even to the lower-level descriptions in the
direct examinations themselves. For cross-examination says implicitly
that the direct examinations themselves were interpretations, as
indeed they were.19 Cross-examiners remind the jury of those aspects
of the situation that the witness has chosen not to reveal. The as-
sumption underlying cross-examination is that the witness has chosen
to cut into the great booming, buzzing confusion of life in a way that
is consciously or unconsciously willful, that he has left something
important out that changes the meaning of everything. The "autopo-
etic" nature of a consistent and coherent direct examination, the
suggestion, indeed the feel, that it tells everything about a subject can
18. See STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT (2000).
19. See STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY 25 (1993).
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be undermined by cross-examination. After an effective direct
examination the deconstructive shock of a well-wrought cross-
examination can be stunning.
There are a number of devices by which the cross-examiner can
offer his "critique" of the direct. All cross-examination employs
short, clear, undeniable statements that together suggest some
inference helpful to the cross-examiner's factual theory, theme, or
legal theory. He may retell the story with slight changes of inclusion,
description, and ordering that show that the "undisputed" facts can
have quite another meaning than the one that was used to construct
the direct. Even if the cross-examiner does not have the wherewithal
to retell the entire story, he may seek concessions on particular facts
and admissions as to the inevitably infinite number of things the
witness does not know or did not do that may change the meaning of
the events. The cross-examiner may directly suggest other interpreta-
tions of the perceptual facts to which the witness testified. He may
suggest that the likely consequences of the witness's version of events
did not occur and so invoke the valid syllogism: If A, then B. But not
B. Therefore not A. The cross-examiner can show the jury how the
witness, who is often an important player in the real-world drama that
had led up to the trial, does not deal fairly with aspects of the situa-
tion that are uncomfortable for him. And, of course, there exists an
entire repertoire of impeachment devices that can cause the jury to
doubt what may appear to be straightforward reports of past percep-
tions. In sum, cross-examination serves to break the selectivity,
willfulness, and manipulativeness that inheres in almost all storytel-
ling. In the entire context of the trial, it is not wholly destructive. It
serves to multiply the perspectives through which the jury sees the
case. Although the constitutive rules of the trial elevate the impor-
tance of a past event, to an extent that mediators view to be obsessive,
still the jury can reach back to that event only through the perform-
ances of lawyers and witnesses. When the trial works, it provides an
apt lens and metaphor for the events that it represents. Part of that
metaphor is provided by the dispositions of witnesses as they perform
under the pressure of cross-examination. Jurors come to trust those
witnesses who have treated them decently, fairly, and show respect
for the important task that the jurors have.
By the time closing argument comes around, each lawyer should
know that the simplifications of opening statement, however inspired,
are a bit too simple. No triable case is perfect, either on the factual or
2003]
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the normative level. A judgment has to be made and that judgment
will require the jury to say what is most important about the case.
But the genius of the trial is to prevent the jury from making the case
a purely symbolic expression of some abstract commitment. The
jury's immersion in the details of the evidence, the "discipline of the
evidence," is designed to make that impossible. And so the lawyer in
closing arguments must circle between the significance of what
occurred and the truth of his factual theory. Both are important.
Closing is an appeal to the freedom of the jury because "you cannot
persuade jurors to do what they do not want to do. The goal of
argument is to help the jury want to do the right thing, to feel com-
fortable in making the proper judgment."20 But this freedom is not
arbitrariness. It is an act of moral and political self-definition that can
be more or less adequate, a better or worse integration of the relevant
considerations, including the level of factual certainty, and the facts'
relative importance. In the classic words of de Tocqueville, the
criminal "jury is, above all, a political institution, and it must be
regarded in this light in order to be duly appreciated.... He who
punishes the criminal is... the real master of society."'21
So much for a very compressed summary of the trial's linguistic
practices. Because my contention here is that the trial has evolved
into a precisely balanced forum, my argument must be carried by
description. Any summary will thus be inadequate and I can only
invite the reader to consider more detailed treatments.2 So far I have
summarized in a very compressed way only the constitutive rules of
the trial and the linguistic performances that it comprises. But these
have to be considered in the context of aspects of the trial that are so
basic, so simple, that their extraordinary significance can easily be
overlooked. "The aspects of things that are most important for us are
hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to
notice something-because it is always before one's eyes.)... [W]e
fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most power-
ful."' 23 First, trial presentation focuses on the concrete, the factual,
20. JAMES W. MCELHANEY, TRIAL NOTEBOOK 499 (2d ed. 1987) (quoting trial lawyer
Jack Liber).
21. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293 (Henry Reeve trans.,
1945).
22. See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 12; BURNS, supra note 11; NORMAN J. FINKEL,
COMMONSENSE JUSTICE (1995).




and the multiple. The obsessive focus on exactly what took place
drives the mind downward, away from lazy abstractions. "[N]o ideas
but in things." 24 It tells the jury implicitly that the details are impor-
tant and that the ordinary modes of moral judgment that are ex-
tremely interested in those details are appropriate for the
understanding and evaluations of the events being tried. Lawyers are
obliged to seek and entitled to receive answers to all relevant ques-
tions, however embarrassing or uncomfortable for our dominant or
"politically correct" (in the broadest sense) understandings. As the
trial proceeds though time, each well-chosen detail can become the
key normative perspective though which all the evidence is under-
stood. The time compression that is characteristic of the American
jury trial protects the unities of theory and theme from the predations
of fading memory. It allows the lawyer to show what cannot be said
and provides the conditions for "the cumulations of probabili-
ties.., too fine to avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be
convertible into syllogisms. '25 The succession of strategic choices that
the lawyer has to make as to what gambits to accept, what evidence to
engage, tends, as the case progresses, to focus the attention of the jury
on just the most difficult and important questions. There is a taut
balance at trial between continuous explication of a theory of the case
and criticism of that explication. Openings are counterposed; cross
follows a continuous direct; parties may not offer their own evidence
on cross; defendant's case follows plaintiff's, followed by plaintiff's
rebuttal, and sometimes defendant's surrebuttal. We have to under-
stand how a perspective holds together but need to keep a mind open
enough to understand that there is another way of understanding the
situation. The trial is spoken and heard. It provides a momentary
identification with all witnesses, but from a physical distance greater
than that of ordinary conversation. It thus provides concretely the
conditions for good judgment-sympathy and detachment. It is a
dramatic event. It is a lens and metaphor that will allow a lawyer with
a good case to be fairer to all the aspects of the evidence in all her
performances. The trial's practices can actualize all the range of
human feeling in a way that creates the conditions for good judg-
24. WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS, PATTERSON 14 (1951).
25. JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, AN ESSAY IN AID OF A GRAMMAR OF ASSENT 288 (Long-
mans, Green & Co. 1930) (1870).
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ment.26 Those practices will "ring true" or not in a way that is dis-
cernable by powerful tacit powers.
Are these merely assertions? Social science investigators, using a
range of different methods, have identified the effects of the trial's
rules, linguistic performances, and basic features. Mercifully, broad
demographic characteristics of juries do not predict verdicts. Juries
are bound by the "discipline of the evidence ' 27 which is understood
with such subtlety that it overwhelms the usual means of multivari-
able analysis. The norms implicit in the trial's linguistic performance
are central to understanding its results. Juries are aware of the public
significance of their role. Deliberation, though significant, is less
important than the encounter of the individual juror with the evi-
dence. 28 The trial is the thing.
The trial works because of the almost unbearable tensions that
are created by the trial's practices. There are tensions between the
roles of the lawyers, witnesses, judge, and jurors. There are, as we
have seen, enormous tensions between the cases taken as a whole and
among the different trial performances. Narrative is very important
at trial, as a carrier of meaning, moral evaluation, and political
identity, but the forms of narrative are distinctive. We have already
seen the contrast between the narratives of opening and direct
examination. But the conditions under which these stories are told
pull them toward each other-the openings are not just "the best
stories." They have to anticipate the other side's case. They have to
anticipate the evidence that will soon be heard. (Otherwise, openings
are "broken promises.") They have to be concerned with the law of
rules -concretely with the possibility of a directed verdict and with
the limitations the doctrine of materiality will impose on the evidence
to come. The rules of the trial force the trial's narratives toward each
other, toward the facts of the case, and toward the rules.
Those tensions create the conditions under which the jury may
discern the meaning of the case, the practical truth of a human
situation. They impose a real discipline upon the jury. They elimi-
nate the arbitrariness that often inheres in our ordinary lazy attitudes
toward large undifferentiated classes of persons and events. They
26. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS 390 (1986).
27. ABRAMSON, supra note 12, at 162.
28. The initial majority prevails in about 90% of cases. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL
VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 110 (1986); Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The American Jury
at Twenty-Five Years, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 323, 343 (1991).
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often achieve through public practices what only a few people can
achieve by the refinement of their own moral judgment.29
The trial works effectively because it does not assume that all the
meaning and so the evaluation of events must be derived from the
legal categories. The trial actualizes the common sense of the jury,
which provides the central source for determining the meaning of the
events tried. Juries are typically instructed that they are to rely on
their "common sense gained from.., experiences in life."30  That
phrase may be given an interpretation that is consistent with the
received view, that common sense provides a set of value-free empiri-
cal generalizations that allow the jury to construct a value-free
narrative of what occurred. It seems to me, however, that an account
of events that contained no evaluation other than those that could be
rigorously derived from the jury instructions would probably be
unintelligible. It certainly is not what the consciously structured
hybrid of languages that we find at trial actually provides. The moral
sources that are actualized at trial exist in the life world of the jurors.
They are the "negotiated truths" that made a certain form of life
possible. They are not arbitrary and a decision derived from them,
duly actualized and refined, is not arbitrary. Least of all is it "purely
emotional." I will summarize below the arguments for the proposi-
tion that sources of "true law," other than the most literal possible
interpretation of the legal text, are legitimate. Those arguments can
fairly be called moral, historical, and structural.
III. WHAT IT ADDS UP To: THINKING WHAT WE Do
The short description I have given fails to do justice to what, with
a modicum of competence, takes place at trial. (A conservative is
always disadvantaged because he must rely on careful description
29. Iris Murdoch put it this way:
Ignorance, muddle, fear, wishful thinking, lack of tests often make us feel that moral
choice is something arbitrary, a matter for personal will rather than for attentive
study.... The difficulty is to keep the attention fixed upon the real situation and to
prevent it from returning surreptitiously to the self with consolations of self-pity, re-
sentment, fantasy, and despair....
[Rlealism, whether of artist or of agent, [i]s a moral achievement.
IRIS MURDOCH, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD 91, 66 (1970).
This explains the central insight of Kantian ethics: "The more the separateness and differ-
ences of other people is realized, and the fact seen that another man has needs and wishes as
demanding as one's own, the harder it becomes to treat a person as a thing." Id. at 66. My
contention is that the devices of the trial seek to occasion by public methods the attention to the
details of a particular situation that moral judgment requires.
30. ILL. P.J.1. CIV. 1.01 (2000).
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rather than the power of one or two ringing abstractions.) But it is
time to move on to the next step, a brief interpretation of the signifi-
cance of what occurs at trial. The decision that the jury makes is a
response "to the meaningfulness of the situation in which one is
engrossed."'" It is because the trial is so engrossing that the jury's
decision is unlikely to be arbitrary, that it responds to "the discipline
of the evidence." Now it is time to understand more fully the mean-
ing of the trial event. There is inevitably an ideal or idealizing aspect
to this enterprise. I am interpreting an ideal trial, but not so ideal that
it is beyond the range of human accomplishment. I am interested in
situated ideals, ideals that are consistently within the range of actual
accomplishment. (Those are also the ideals that point the way to
possible reforms.)
The trial proceeds, as I said, by the construction and deconstruc-
tion of narrative. What is the significance of the centrality of narra-
tive at trial, both the relatively free interpretive narrative of opening
statement and the much constrained narrative "in the language of
perception" offered on direct examination? Narratives allow the jury
to "organize and analyze the vast amounts of information involved in
making a legal judgment."32 "[W]hat does not get structured narra-
tively suffers loss in memory. 33 The trial wisely assumes that narra-
tives are at least a reliable starting point for understanding a human
event, "that stories are lived before they are told,"34 that narrative is
congruent in some way with the actual structure of human experi-
ence. (It also wisely employs the whole range of devices that we have
already examined to correct the possible distortions of free narrative.)
Opening statements are necessarily simplifying, and that simplifica-
tion necessarily involves a judgment of relative importance that
actualizes the meaning of the story: "the judgment of importance, by
getting rid of the accessory, creates continuity: that which actually
took place is disconnected and torn by insignificance, the narrative is
meaningful because of its continuity. '35  Good story-telling can
31. Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV.
937, 979 (1990) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
32. W. LANCE BENNETr & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM 5 (1981).
33. JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 56 (1990).
34. BURNS, supra note 11, at 159.
35. Maria Villela Petit, Thinking History: Methodology and Epistemology in Patil Ricoeur's
Reflections on History from History and Truth to Time and Narrative, in THE NARRATIVE
PATH 35-36 (T. Peter Kemp & David Rasmussen eds., 1989).
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"reveal[] meaning without committing the error of defining it."36 By
allowing lawyers to tell a relatively37 unconstrained story in opening,
the law allows more of the full human significance of the past events
to enter the courtroom as determined by the moral sensibilities that
are implicit in all the practices that structure the life world. It pro-
tects against the danger of bureaucratic ossification that always
haunts the law. 38 This morality is not the abstract morality of princi-
ple, but can include everything necessary to the "complexity of the
original moral problem."3 9 Narrative is internally related to issues of
justice:
Stories tell us how each one finds or loses his just place in the rela-
tion to others in the world. And the communication of the story is
confirmed when justice has been recognized. Is there any story we
tell in which justice is not at issue? It is almost as if we constitute a
jury out of our listeners, so that it falls to them to judge the particu-
lar view of the case that we present in our story.40
Stories are told when there has been a deviation from a tradi-
tional pattern and the community needs to understand the event in
light of an inventory of common-sense beliefs about the sources of
deviance. Otherwise the offense would remain one of an "unbearable
sequence of sheer happenings" 41 that would undermine the convic-
tions that make our common life significant. Finally, the form of
narrative used in opening statement places the jury within the story
being told. The story says that there has been a disruption of the just
patterns of life in which we all share and that action is necessary to
restore those patterns. This is, of course, precisely the structure of
the commutative justice that is central to legal justice-the restoring
36. HANNAH ARENDT, MEN IN DARK TIMES 105 (1968).
37. "Relatively" unconstrained because it is still constrained by the anticipation of the
opponent's case and the discipline of the evidence to follow, supported by the ethical rule
prohibiting the lawyer from alluding to any matter of which there will not be admissible
evidence. The opening statement has a performative element-it is a promise to produce
evidence -and no one wants to be accused of breaking his promise.
38. As Arendt put it:
No doubt, wherever public life and its law of equality are completely victorious, wher-
ever a civilization succeeds in eliminating to reducing to a minimum the dark back-
ground of difference, it will end in complete petrifaction, for having forgotten that man
is only the master, not the creator of the world.
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 302 (1973).
39. Stuart Hampshire, Public and Private Morality, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 39
(Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978).
40. Melvyn A. Hill, The Fictions of Mankind and the Stories of Men, in HANNAH ARENDT,
THE RECOVERY OF THE PUBLIC WORLD 290 (Melvyn A. Hill ed., 1979).
41. ARENDT, supra note 34, at 104.
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of the just balance that characterized the community before its violent
disruption.42
The battle for the imagination of the jury begins with opening
statements. After the openings, the jury will be in a position to
answer three questions. The first is, "In what way is it more likely to
have happened?" Here jurors are relying on their common sense
conceived as a set of common-sense empirical generalizations. The
second question the jury will be able to answer is, "Which under-
standing of these events invokes a more powerful norm?" This will
be a moral judgment. The third question is, "What understanding of
these events invites us to act in the manner more consistent with our
public identity?" In answering this question, the jury is acting "politi-
cally" in the manner that de Tocqueville thought distinctive to the
American jury.43
Even in this preliminary stance, the jury is not reacting solely to
"the best story the lawyer can tell" in abstraction from the evidence
to come and the legal standards embodied in the law of rules. Each
lawyer must anticipate the other side's case. The other attorney can
be relied upon to inform the jury of any facts inconsistent with the
story he wants to tell. Second, as I mentioned, openings have per-
formative quality as promises to produce admissible and credible
evidence, a characteristic enforced by the rules of professional
conduct. Third, the law of rules is represented in two ways. Except
for the criminal defendant, the parties' factual theory of the case will
have to survive a motion for a directed verdict and so must be ade-
quate "as a matter of law." And the evidence that each lawyer will
present must pass the test of materiality, the standard for which is set
by the rules embedded in the jury instructions. Although lawyers
have relative freedom to invoke all the dominant moral values of the
jury's life world in opening statements, the law and the evidence
make their strong impact even here.
So the jury can make preliminary determinations of the relative
strength of the cases after opening statements. Structural elements of
the theory of the case are weighed: "The inadequate development of
setting, character, means or motive, as any literature student knows,
render a story's actions ambiguous.... In a trial it is grounds for
reasonable doubt." 44 Further, the story is initially tested against the
42. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. 5.
43. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 21, at 293.
44. BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 32, at 10.
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pre-existent common-sense generalizations of the society. These are
stored in the community's "web of belief," a set of generalizations
that have the form, "Generally and for the most part .... [e.g., moth-
ers will promote the interests of their children]."4a  But, thankfully,
these common-sense generalizations do not decide the case. Com-
mon sense very rarely confronts the level of detailed factual devel-
opment that the trial provides. Every time one lawyer says,
"Generally and for the most part,..." the other lawyer is likely to
say, "Yes, but not where.... " Each new case requires a genuine
insight, what Peirce called an "abduction, '46 that must seek out the
intelligibility inherent in these particular facts. The jury also will
begin to evaluate the case based on the openings' struggle for the
higher moral ground in the particular circumstances that the details of
the narrative reveal. Placing the facts in a narrative form "is a de-
mand.., for moral meaning, a demand that sequences of events be
assessed as to their significance as elements of a moral drama. '47
"The world of recountable events" is an ethical world48 and "narrative
already belongs to the ethical field of its claim-inseparable from
narration-to ethical justice. ' 49 Thus the tentative moral judgment
that the jury makes after the openings is based not on a moral theory
but on "an ethics already realized"50 in the practices and institutions of
the society. Finally, the narratives of opening statement require the
jury to consider the relationship of the case to their own public
identities. In opening, the lawyers are signaling to the jury that their
decision in the case will determine the shape of the society for which
they are now inevitably responsible. "By his manner of judging, the
45. BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, S.J., INSIGHT: A STUDY IN HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 173-
206 (1957).
46. See, e.g., Thomas A Sebeok & Jean Umiker-Sebeok, "You Know My Method": A
Juxtaposition of Charles S. Peirce and Sherlock Holmes, in THE SIGN OF THREE: DUPIN,
HOLMES, PEIRCE 11-54 (Umberto Eco & Thomas A. Sebeok eds., 1983).
47. Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, in ON
NARRATIVE 1 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1981). White's notion of morality is conservative or
Hegelian in that he sees the morality that is invoked in narrative as embedded in social practices
and institutions. "[N]arrativity, certainly in factual storytelling and probably in fictional
storytelling as well, is intimately related to, if not a function of, the impulse to moralize reality,
that is, to identify it with the social system that is the source of any morality that we can
imagine." Id. at 14.
48. T. Peter Kemp, Toward a Narrative Ethics: A Bridge Between Ethics and the Narrative
Reflection of Ricoeur, in THE NARRATIVE PATH, supra note 35, at 65.
49. PAUL RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE 249 (Kathleen McLaughlin & David Pellauer
trans., 1988).
50. Peter Kemp, Ethics and Narrativity, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR 371
(Lewis Edwin Hahn ed., 1995).
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person discloses to an extent also himself, what kind of person he is,
and this disclosure... is involuntary."'" This identity is a public
identity:
Storytelling offers us the means of reconciliation with reality. But,
in effect it also makes a common understanding of reality, and so, a
world, possible for us in our plurality.... Stories tell us how each
one finds or loses his just place in relation to others in the world.
And the communication of the story is confirmed when justice has
been recognized. 52
This is precisely the place of the jury in American life of which
de Tocqueville has given the classic expression:
The jury, and more especially the civil jury, serves to communicate
the spirit of the judges to the minds of all the citizens; and this
spirit, with the habits which attend it, is the soundest preparation
for free institutions. It imbues all classes with a respect for the
thing judged and with the notion of right.... The jury teaches
every man not to recoil before the responsibility of his own actions
and impresses him with that manly confidence without which no
political virtue can exist. It invests each citizen with a kind of mag-
istracy; it makes them all feel the duties which they are bound to
discharge towards society and the part which they take in its gov-
ernment. By obliging men to turn their attention to other affairs
than their own, it rubs off that private selfishness which is the rust
of society.5"
The lawyers in a well-tried case, beginning with opening state-
ments, are providing the jury the means by which they can perform an
act of interpretation: "What we are interpreting is ourselves, and the
past and present social worlds that make us what we are.... [W]e
already possess a preunderstanding of our historical identity and
social relationships. This we get from our past, from the cultural and
linguistic traditions that compose our historical identity. '5 4
The vast bulk of the trial is consumed not with opening state-
ments, but with the presentation of evidence. I have already de-
scribed how the presentation of testimony in response to nonleading
questions and in the language of perception serves to build the
powerful tensions that are at the heart of the trial's genius, as does
cross-examination. The evidentiary phase quickly moves the center
of gravity at trial away from morally and politically significant stories
to the inconvenient details of the facts and the multiplicity of the
51. RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 18 (1983).
52. Hill, supra note 40, at 289-90.
53. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 21, at 284-85.
54. BEINER, supra note 51, at 19-20.
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perspectives of the witnesses. Paradoxically, by giving particularity
and empirical truth their due, the trial provides a strong critique of
common-sense generalizations.
It is only when we are confronted by the demands of action in con-
text of a particular set of circumstances that we get a true under-
standing of what our ends really are, and reassess those ends in
relation to a new understanding of our life as a whole. Action in
the particular circumstances of life is a continuing dialogue between
what we think our life is about, and the particularities of moral and
practical exigency.5
Jurors come from a world where mass-circulation journalism and
sentimental mass-media fiction anesthetize common sense by elimi-
nating most of the tensions between the general norms and the
detailed realities of particular cases. One of the reasons why so many
jurors value their jury service is that it enables them to experience
what their common sense, elevated by the discipline of the evidence,
is capable of. The trial provides a self-criticism of the overgeneralized
"scripts" within which much of our common sense is stored.
The consciously structured hybrid of languages at trial creates a
fair contest among real values where the appropriate balance can only
be fought out. A legal system where decision flows easily from the
"sort" of case presented is a system where there is relatively little
internal tension and, I would suggest, relatively little justice. As in
physics, where an infinitely more abstract point of view is appropriate,
"only by entertaining multiple and mutually limiting points of view,
building up a composite picture, can we approach the real richness of
the world. '5 6
The tension of opposites created by the trial actualizes the
largely tacit powers of the jury. As Holmes put it, "many honest and
sensible judgments.., express an intuition of experience which
outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled impres-
sions-impressions which may lie beneath consciousness without
losing their worth."57 Or in Judge Weinstein's words:
The jury's evaluation of the evidence relevant to a material propo-
sition requires a gestalt or synthesis of evidence which seldom
needs to be analyzed precisely. Any item of evidence must be in-
terpreted in the context of all the evidence introduced.... In giv-
ing appropriate, if sometimes unreflective, weight to a specific piece
55. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
56. Richard Rhodes, The Philosopher Physicist, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1992 (review of
ABRAHAM PAIS, NIELS BOHR'S TIMES: IN PHYSICS, PHILOSOPHY, AND POLITY (1991)).
57. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585,598 (1907).
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of evidence the trier will fit it into a shifting mosaic....
[C]onfirming evidence of that other line of proof may require a re-
evaluation of the witness' credibility and a complex readjustment of
the assessment of all the interlocking evidence. 8
The jury's cognitive operations at trial are holistic and interpre-
tive. The jury performs an integration of all the evidence within the
horizon of its own practical responsibilities. It grasps a literally
indescribable constellation of facts, norms, and possibilities for action
through "the cumulation of probabilities.., too fine to avail sepa-
rately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms."5 9
The jury's consideration is likely
to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments than to
the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not form a
chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose
fibers may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently nu-
merous and intimately connected. 6°
Jury determinations often have a quality of depth or substance
about them. This is true because the trial puts the jury in a position to
judge with care and skill. Why this is true requires an account of the
ways in which the consciously structured hybrid of languages and
practices at trial really illuminate what is at stake at trial. Very
briefly,6 the different languages of the trial express modes of under-
standing that are congruent with quite different norms that find their
natural homes in different spheres of social life. They have a funda-
mentum in rebus. And the res are social practices, "forms of life."
What is at stake at trial is the relative importance of the norms at play
and the relative appropriateness of moral judgment, legal categoriza-
tion, or public self-constitution to the resolution of the cause. Be-
cause we have built a society that, like any decent society, has
relatively different spheres constituted by different norms, somewhere
in our social practices, we must discern what is the most important
aspect of this particular, very particular, case. And we often do it at
trial. The unbearable tensions among the "language regions" at trial
conform to the great tensions among social practices in the world.
The trial does justice and creates the institutional conditions of the
58. United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp 43 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 414 F.2d 1296 (2d Cir.
1969). For the classic, if somewhat tongue-in-cheek expression of nonformal thinking at trial,
see Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 279 (1929).
59. NEWMAN, supra note 25, at 288.
60. 5 CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, Some Consequences of Four Incapacities, in COLLECTED
PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 5.265 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1958).
61. I have tried to provide a somewhat fuller account in BURNS, supra note 11, at 183-244.
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possibility of justice's accomplishment. 62 Although its power comes
from its conservative quality and the centrality of common-sense
moral categories, it performs a distinctively modern function for us,
"less to create constantly new forms of life than to creatively renew
actual forms by taking advantage of their internal multiplicity and
tensions and their friction with one another. 63
There are philosophical positions that support the view of the
jury trial that I have just sketched out. They are very powerful
positions and serve, at the theoretical level, as those "fibers ever so
slender" 64 to help justify that view. On the cognitive side, philoso-
phers have identified the human intellectual capacities that juries
must exercise to respond to the trial's languages and practices. The
Kantian tradition speaks of "reflective judgment," the capacity we
have to operate without pregiven generalizations. This power is
activated by multiplying the standpoints from which a situation can be
understood to achieve a kind of generality, but not, however, "the
generality of the concept. It is, on the contrary, closely connected
with particulars, with the particular conditions of the standpoints one
has to go through in order to arrive at one's own general stand-
point." 65  This multiplication of perspectives succeeds when "a
particular issue is forced into the open that it may show itself from all
sides, in every possible perspective, until it is flooded and made
transparent by the full light of human comprehension." 66 The multi-
plicity of trial languages and performance is designed to create the
conditions for that kind of illumination. The Aristotelian tradition
speaks of "practical wisdom" as relying on a kind of tacit judgment of
perceptual identification-our ability to see something "as" it is.
Human intelligence can dwell on the tensions of the particular to
understand it for what it is beyond the capacity of principles likely to
be established ahead of time. This ability so closely parallels the
intelligence that trial languages and practices activate, that I must
quote at some length:
We reflect on an incident not by subsuming it under a general rule,
not by assimilating its features to the terms of an elegant scientific
62. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 380 (1994). The trial thus meets our needs as
modems who know that all of our social institutions are of our own making, and so subject to
criticism.
63. DAVID KOLB, THE CRITIQUE OF PURE MODERNITY 259 (1986).
64. PIERCE, supra note 60, at 5.264.
65. HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 44 (1989).
66. HANNAH ARENDT, Truth and Politics, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 242 (1977).
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procedure, but by burrowing down into the depths of the particular,
finding images and connections that will permit us to see it more
truly, describe it more richly; by combining this burrowing with a
horizontal drawing of connections, so that every horizontal link
contributes to the depth of our view of the particular, and every
new depth creates new horizontal links.... The image of learning
expressed in this style ... stresses responsiveness and an attention
to complexity; it discourages the search for the simple and, above
all, for the reductive.... [C]orrect choice (or: good interpretation)
is, first and foremost, a matter of keenness and flexibility of percep-
tion, rather than conformity to a set of simplifying principles.67
Finally, the interpretive or hermeneutical tradition stresses our
ability to understand through circular codetermination of particulars
and universals, on the one hand, and the details of a particular
situation and our projects, on the other hand. Clifford Geertz speaks
of "a continuous dialectical tacking between the most local of local
detail and the most global of global structures in such a way as to
bring both into view simultaneously. '68 The particular situation is
understood against a pre-existent common sense, which is both a web
of belief and also "a learned way of acting-or 'coping' with things
and situations-that renders the world meaningful" and this because
"the way human beings exist or 'dwell' in the world is fundamentally
in a state of practical absorption in tasks and skills." 69 There are thus
two circles of the understanding around which the jury moves. The
first moves between the individual pieces of evidence and the whole
theory and theme of the case. The second moves between the details
of the evidence and the jury's practical options. For example, the
defendant's actions may be found to be "knowing" depending in part
on the risks of releasing him back out into the community.70 All three
of these modes of judging claim a "communal validity." Arendt
found in Kant's notion of reflective judgment a
mode of thinking that is neither to be identified with the expression
of private feelings nor to be confused with the type of universality
characteristic of 'cognitive reason.' It is a mode of thinking that is
capable of dealing with the particular in its particularity but which
nevertheless makes the claim to communal validity. When onejudges, one judges as a member of a human community.7'
67. NUSSBAUM, supra note 26, at 69.
68. Geertz, supra note 3, at 239.
69. Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253, 268, 270
(1996).
70. See generally Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the
Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85 (2002).
71. RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM 217 (1983).
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Likewise, Aristotelian practical wisdom involves a disciplined
and careful perception of an individual situation in light of a complex
web of public norms.7 2 And interpretive understanding involves an
integrative understanding of a particular situation in light of shared
modes of acting. All three achieve an objectivity rooted in a refined
grasp of the relevance of basic norms to a particular situation.
Can the consciously structured hybrid of languages used at trial
find the truth? I believe the answer is an emphatic "Yes," though
once again such an affirmative answer depends on philosophical
commitments, all of which are defensible. First, trial verdicts can be
true if narrative is embedded in the nature of human action, that
stories are lived before they are told. The narratives of the trial,
taken together and criticized ("deconstructed") by the acid of cross-
examination and argument, can get close to the real human event.
Second, though common sense must rely on common-sense generali-
zations and determinations of the probable, vigorous advocacy and
well-wrought institutions can allow judgments of the probable to
converge on the actually true:
Consider once again how the practices of the trial aid this process.
The opening statement is a promise as well as a story: without sup-
porting admissible evidence, it is a broken promise. Lawyers are
prohibited from mentioning anything in opening that will not be
supported by such evidence. They are constrained in the process of
trial preparation both of their own clients and of nonclient wit-
nesses by ethical rules against the creation and presentation of false
evidence and by the criminal law against the suborning of perjury.
Lawyers are prohibited from suggesting anything in cross-
examination that they do not have a good-faith basis to believe is
true or (sometimes) admissible evidence to support. Testimony is
given under oath. It is subject to cross-examination. Lawyers are
permitted to introduce evidence to support their own cases and also
to undermine their opponents'. The law of evidence, at least in the
hands "of a strong and wise trial judge," serves to exclude both ut-
terly unreliable evidence and the sorts of evidence that serve to dis-
sipate the fruitful tensions of the trial with irrelevancy. So a lawyer
cannot just tell the most plausible story, regardless of its truth. To
the extent that a theory of the case is rendered initially plausible by
a description which relies on the omission of details that ought
fairly to be included, the correction will not be long in coming. To
the extent that the jury was initially "taken in," then immediately
disillusioned, to that extent will the general plausibility of the posi-
tion be undermined, not only because of the performative offense,
but also because of the implicit admission that such a distortion was
72. NUSSBAUM, supra note 26, at 69.
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the only way the position could be defended. In short, the ethics of
the bar aim at dissuading "puny" disputation, and the devices of the
trial are designed to create the likelihood that the better argument
and stronger evidence will prevail.73
Third, the trial will work to the extent that there is a capacity of
the trial to show more than it can tell, and correspondingly, there is a
human capacity to grasp a practical truth manifest in the tensions
created by the trial's consciously structured hybrid of languages.
Trial languages do not simply play off one another, they reveal
something, they "actually put us in contact with the sources they
tap[s]. They can realize the contact."74 Fourth, the trial will be able to
reach the truth of a human situation to the extent that fundamentally
interpretive methods can converge on that truth. The trial shows us
the meaning of the situation in a way that would be invisible without
its methods; yet, once we have experienced the trial, we cannot see
the situation other than in the light the trial has shed. Finally, the
trial will converge on the human truth of a situation to the extent that
there exist no institutions that are better designed to achieve the
practical purpose of the trial and those purposes are rooted in the
most important human interests. All those propositions are, I be-
lieve, more than defensible.
IV. WHAT THE TRIAL DOES FOR US
One of the most demanding contemporary tasks is to refine
norms that apply to the basic structure of society, the pattern of rules
and practices within which we live our ordinary moral lives. Since the
French Revolution, and for Americans, certainly since the New Deal,
it has been impossible to maintain that we have not created those
rules and practices and, therefore, that we are not responsible for
their shape. But we moderns have also inherited modes of thought
that place these structures beyond good and evil, beyond moral
evaluation. In these modes of thought the basic structure can only be
known "scientifically," though the forms this science should take have
varied quite significantly. This notion of the amorality of the basic
structure of society has led to disaster and is one aspect of what
Arendt has called "the onslaught of modernity."75
73. BURNS, supra note 11, at 229-30 (citations omitted).
74. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 512 (1989).
75. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 196 (1963).
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What the trial is for us is a forum within which we can carefully
develop the norms that ought to apply to the basic structure of
society. We can do this with adequate attention to the details of the
individual case. We can do this in a way that respects the differences
that exist among the different spheres of human action and the
importance of moral judgment, legal formality, and political responsi-
bility. The trial acknowledges that most problematic situations have
moral, legal, and political dimensions and creates a forum to do
exactly what we need, to make judgments of relative importance of
the norms implicit in these spheres. However, it addresses this
question of relative importance only for the case being tried. The
trial makes it possible to do practically what our best thinkers have
not been able to do theoretically, to provide for a practical reshaping
of our basic structure, only in a careful, case-by-case basis. And so
the trial fulfills that particularly modern function without succumbing
to the "onslaught of modernity," "less to create constantly new forms
of life than to creatively renew actual forms by taking advantage of
their internal multiplicity and their friction with one another. 7 6
What is true of the trial is also true at the constitutional policy
level. Real understanding, once again, requires "a continuous dialec-
tical tacking between the most local of local detail and the most
global of global structures in such a way as to bring both into view
simultaneously."77 I have tried to provide an interpretation of the
nature of the trial that focuses both on local detail and on the global
significance of those details. But I have hardly done all of what needs
to be done to identify the true situated ideal that the trial embodies
that can, in turn, serve as the standard for further development. The
main lines of the situated ideal of the jury trial that I have merely
sketched here in contrast to the received view must be justified "by
the mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting
together into one coherent view."78 What else is necessary for "every-
thing" to fit together?
V. BROADER CONTEXTS
One thing necessary for everything to fit together is an under-
standing of the jury trial in relation to other institutions of self-
76. KOLB, supra note 63, at 259.
77. Geertz, supra note 3, at 239.
78. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 579.
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government. Nancy Marder has been developing a "process" view of
the jury that does just that.79 She has noted, as have 1,80 that our
actual jury practices are inconsistent with what I have called the
received view. Even within the law of rules, juries actually engage in
broad-based interpretation well beyond what could be described as
"fact finding." They regularly determine what is "reasonable" in tort
actions and make practical determinations about what constitutes
"reasonable doubt" in criminal cases.81 Marder shows how consistent
patterns of jury determinations have been significant in reconstituting
what can only be called our "basic structure," "the way in which the
major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and
determine the division of advantages from social cooperation. '" 82
"[Jiuries, by declining to find contributory negligence, essentially
created a regime of comparative negligence long before the legisla-
ture and judges had eliminated contributory negligence as a de-
fense." 83  Juries have likewise changed the legal order through
patterns of decisions in wrongful discharge cases and the law of
product safety. Marder provides an account of the relative strengths
that juries have in comparison to courts and legislatures 84 that sup-
plements my account of the ways in which the discipline of the trial
elevates their common-sense judgment.
Marder writes in an institutional idiom, justifying the jury's role
in a way that a political scientist would appreciate. By contrast, Akhil
Reed Amar has argued recently for a central role for the jury based
on constitutional history5 and theory. Amar finds the jury to be the
"paradigmatic image underlying the original Bill of Rights." 86 The
framers understood it in just the way that de Tocqueville would
express in the next generation, as serving a self-consciously political
79. Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 877, 910 (1999).
80. BURNS, supra note 11, at 26-33. My account focuses on the procedural rules and
practices surrounding the trial.
81. See Lillquist, supra 70, at 87.
82. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 7. Rawls includes as major institutions "the political
constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements." Id.
83. Marder, supra note 79, at 910.
84. Id. at 918.
85. Charles Wolfram's classic article on the Seventh Amendment, The Constitutional
History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973), argues persuasively that the
federal civil jury requirement was proposed and adopted under the assumptions that juries
would decide cases quite differently than would federal judges and that this difference was to
the good.




function.87 This political function is the expression of the sovereignty
which remains in the people. Indeed the distinctive feature of Feder-
alist political theory was to place sovereignty in the people, rather
than in the legislature, where their teachers, Locke and Blackstone,
had placed it.88 This sovereignty, Amar writes, can be found in rules
that prevent "judges from directing verdicts of guilt or requiring
special verdicts in criminal cases; barring trial judges from reversing,
and appellate courts from reviewing, criminal jury acquittals; allowing
criminal defendants to escape government efforts to use collateral
estoppel offensively; and preventing challenges to inconsistent
criminal jury verdicts." 89 He goes so far as to envision a function of
"jury review" of legislation implicit in the Bill of Rights analogous to
that established for the federal courts in Marbury v. Madison 0
Although only implicit in the Bill of Rights (the jury did not have its
John Marshall, as it turned out!), these notions can also be found in a
more pervasive, and more disciplined, way in the very trial practices I
have described.
In sum, an understanding of the jury in largely its present form
can be defended by a careful description of its languages and prac-
tices, by an interpretation of its moral significance for us, by an
understanding of the jury's place in the structure of American institu-
tions, by its constitutional history and significance, and by philosophi-
cal arguments concerning our need to develop moral norms applying
to the basic structure of society.
I want to turn now to the developments that have pushed us to a
more crimped understanding of the jury and sketch out in very broad
terms the social developments and jurisprudential issues that will
determine the place of the jury in our legal order in the coming
decades.
VI. THE SOURCES OF PRESSURE ON THE JURY: YESTERDAY AND
TODAY
Amar is surprised at the strength of what we can only call strong
and, as it turned out, partially unrealized sources for the jury's central
role in the Constitution and at "how strikingly powerful the jury
87. See id. at 83.
88. GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1789, at 162,530
(1972).
89. AMAR, supra note 86, at 104.
90. Id. at 98.
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might have become had post-1800 history unfolded differently." 91 We
take for granted today a road created by turns that were hardly
inevitable. Seventh Amendment jurisprudence was early given a first
principle, that the amendment establishes a civil jury right to the
extent that it existed in England in 1791, that was far from inevitable
and designed to be restrictive.92 We can hardly remember that
motions for directed verdict, judgments notwithstanding the verdict,
and summary judgment were once thought to raise profound constitu-
tional problems. It is fairly clear that the current federal jury instruc-
tion informing the jury that they are obliged to follow "the law" (that
is, the rule in the instruction) whether or not they found it to be
morally appropriate for the resolution of this case would not have
commanded broad assent in 1800.
The full history of these developments has yet to be written.
They are part of a much larger story. Intertwined from the beginning
of American government, there have been three understandings of
first principles applicable to what I will call constitutional policy. The
centrality of the jury has drawn on the first two. The natural rights
model finds its immediate source in the Declaration of Independence
and has a place in the republican vision and the "higher law back-
ground of American constitutional law." 93 It has had its classical
theorists and continues to have adherents. The jury trial has been
understood as a forum for the discernment of higher law.94 The
republican model found its immediate classical expression in the
Antifederalist writings, is prominent in the Bill of Rights, has a
powerful institutional expression in the jury trial,95 and resurfaces at
different times and in different legal contexts. It, too, has its theorists.
The model of instrumental rationality finds its classical expression in
the Federalist writings and finds institutional expression in interest
group understandings of legislation, administrative practices that
employ cost-benefit analysis, other forms of social-scientific theory as
their preferred languages, and in a style of judging, with immediate
roots in the New Deal, that sees law as the instrument of "social
engineering." (A central American institution, the market, has been
justified historically first under a natural rights model, and more
91. Id. at 103.
92. See Wolfram, supra note 85, at 639-42.
93. Edward Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARV. L. REV. 149 (1928).
94. On the jury as expressive of "higher law," see ABRAMSON, supra note 12, at 57-95.
95. Id. at 17-55.
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recently has employed the ultimately utilitarian language of efficient
resource allocation as its mode of self-justification.)
Historically, the three modes of rationality have often been de-
ployed against one another. The republican vision that was embed-
ded in the jury trial was increasingly limited by judicial action
throughout the nineteenth century. There were a number of motives
for this limitation beyond the simple class bias of upper-class judges
that the Antifederalists consistently warned against. The slavery
controversy presented to American law an issue in which the constitu-
tional compromise was discontinuous with the ordinary morality of
the Northern half of the Nation. Here was a case where law and
common morality diverged. Northern judges whose first allegiance
was to law or to the Constitution felt bound to prevent Northern
juries from reaching "illegal and unconstitutional" decisions and
began to devise doctrinal strategies to take certain issues away from
the jury.96 Next, the period of rapid economic expansion after the
Civil War was supported in the judiciary by men who developed
procedural doctrines that were designed to support capital concentra-
tion and efficiency. They portrayed the "populist" jury as represent-
ing only one of several competing social interests and developed a
self-understanding that placed the judge as a fair and neutral arbiter
among social classes.97 Paradoxically, they employed natural rights
language in this effort and developed a specific concept of the rule of
law. New Deal rhetoric attacked constitutional uses of natural law
argument, tended toward positivism in legal philosophy, and elevated
various forms of instrumental rationality at the appellate level and,
most importantly, in the vast system of administrative law and adjudi-
cation the New Deal created.98 Since the 1960s, styles of normative
and republican thinking have attacked instrumental rationality and
the modes of social ordering intertwined with it, and have sought to
supplant the "social engineering" of New Deal jurisprudence. 9  In
constitutional interpretation, judges have tried to identify the mutu-
ally limiting interrelations of history, functional or instrumental
rationality, and fundamental right.
96. See id. at 77-82.
97. Id. at 88-90.
98. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 6-22 (1984).
99. See, e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Richard L. Revesz,
Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and The Discounting of Human Lives, 99




This short sketch forms the background of the kinds of jurispru-
dential questions the resolution of which will be closely intertwined
with the fate of the jury trial in the coming decades. Let me first
review the perspective from which the jury trial is likely to be at-
tacked and try to locate the real questions underlying the partisan
rhetoric that is critical of the jury.100
The centrality of the jury is currently a political issue because of
developments during the past fifty years that have, to some small
degree, reversed the decline of the jury during the nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries. Seventh Amendment jurisprudence has
broadened the availability of the civil jury in the federal courts. Most
importantly, a series of Supreme Court decisions and congressional
enactments has democratized the American jury so that jurors are
100. As I write this, I am looking at a recent quarter-page ad on the op-ed page of the New
York Times for December 26, 2002 taken by a group called Common Good, whose mission is
"Reforming America's Lawsuit Culture." Is the Legal System Broken?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26,
2002, at A35. (The space in the Times was donated by ExxonMobil.) It begins with a good
statement of the natural rights position (the first sentence) combined with the liberal position
(the second sentence): "Law is an essential pillar of freedom because it sets boundaries of right
and wrong. With law as a reliable guide, people can make free choices without fearing
retribution or abuse." Id. The ad goes on to criticize the jury trial for its variability ("standards
today are changeable from jury to jury"), leading to a lack of predictability ("[M]any Americans
now go through the day looking over their shoulders instead of accomplishing their goals."
"Today many Americans feel nervous doing almost anything."). Id. The effects of this
variability are then argued in the contexts of hospitals and schools, rather than of oil companies.
Id. Globally, "[liegal fear has become a defining characteristic of American culture." Id. The
victims, the ad continues, are common sense and fairness ("Lottery-like verdicts provides riches
to a few to the detriment of many, sometimes leaving no funds to compensate true victims.").
Id. A vast agenda is mapped out:
Reform is desperately needed but must go much further than capping excessive
awards. Reform must restore reliability to law. That requires judges and legislatures
to take back the authority, abandoned in the 1960s, to make deliberate judgments of
who can sue for what. Otherwise, people don't know here they stand, and fear re-
places freedom.
Id.
Ads like this represent the use of the advocacy methods honed by advertising agencies and
political consultants for a mass audience. These groups are doing what they do best, using the
methods that they know. Money plus oversimplification can work. Although I have heard
prominent lawyers who represent defendants in civil cases praise the fairness and care of juries,
that is not the perspective generally taken by their clients, whose "marketing boys" certainly
know how to run an ad campaign. The ad is certainly right in assuming the fate of the jury will
be decided in legislatures and courts. In the interest-group liberal battle-ground of the
legislatures, groups, prominently trial lawyers and citizen groups, will have to engage using
interest-group political means. In the courts, we can only hope that judges will have developed
an appreciation of the trial from their years of practice and remember the constitutional status
of the jury trial.
Putting aside politics, what is the message of the ad? It seems that key criticism of the jury
trial is that results are unpredictable compared with the decisions that judges might make. This
is a legitimate issue, but much more subtle than the ad suggests. See Robert P. Burns, The
Lawfulness of the American Trial, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 205, 235-39 (2001).
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now much more likely to be representative, if not of the country, at
least of the electorate. 101 It is no accident that opposition to the jury
has grown since this last development. I have tried to show how the
discipline of the evidence at trial creates an environment in which
events are evaluated with an enormously more searching understand-
ing of the facts than occurs in most political debate. I have tried to
show as well that the common-law trial is a traditional institution
drawing on ordinary morality and common sense. This mode of
thought is discontinuous with that at the heart of other major Ameri-
can institutions, the private and public bureaucracies that employ,
indeed are constituted, by forms of instrumental rationality. I have
tried to argue that basic decency can be preserved only if ordinary
moral and common-sense reasoning structures the forum within
which forms of instrumental rationality have to justify themselves.
That is what Arendt meant when she said that traditional American
institutions and practices have saved us from the worst excesses of
"the onslaught of modernity."1 2 I do not think that American juries
are so naYve that they do not understand the importance of thinking
instrumentally in technological and even in economic contexts.
Corporate cost-benefit decisions and utilitarian reasoning in creating
criminal penalties can be justified in the language of ordinary moral-
ity after a searching factual review of the particular case. But it is
central for us that we have a forum that consistently and carefully
requires that kind of justification.
There is a very subtle and, I think, reciprocal relationship be-
tween dominant intellectual or philosophical positions and institu-
tional developments. Because my academic background is in
philosophy, I tend to think of questions of institutional design as
philosophical questions. But which view will come to be "dominant"
is the result of whose arguments are "better" in all kinds of fora-
newspapers, political party caucuses, legislatures, courts, TV ad
wars-some of which are quite far from ideal speech situations. The
better argument need not prevail. Nonetheless, let me try to identify
the philosophical or jurisprudential questions with which the future of
the jury trial is intertwined. Space will allow me to do little more than
identify the questions.
At the highest level of generality, there is the question of the
characteristics of fora within which issues about the basic structure of
101. See ABRAMSON, supra note 12, at 115-31.
102. ARENDT, supra note 75, at 196.
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society are considered. I have argued that the trial does this in an
enormously subtle and rich way. But there is an alternative position.
One version would urge that there exists, in one way or another, a
"science of society" or, at least, "sciences of society" that exhaust the
social field. We cannot know the basic structure of society using
ordinary morality and common sense, but only "scientifically." This
science should be applied to resolving individual cases in the same
way that natural science is applied to solving technical questions.
Only those trained in the science can understand the arguments and
make reliable judgments. A lay jury cannot. Further, the jury trial
itself is an intense encounter with the facts of a particular situation,
understood, inevitably, in common-sense moral terms and, however
refined by the devices of the trial, those are not appropriate for the
resolution of the questions about the basic structure of society that
are implicated in so many cases. ("Would you want a jury to set the
federal funds discount rate?") This perspective would suggest that
the kind of society into which we are moving will inevitably (and
therefore "should") be administered by experts applying scientific,
sometimes social scientific, knowledge bureaucratically. 103 The jury
trial could fall victim to our glacial movement toward an imperial-
bureaucratic style of government.
This kind of bureaucratic state would make most of its decisions
through what our legal system calls "informal agency action." For
historical reasons, of course, cases will still find their way into court.
1°4
If such cases find their way to court, they should be adjudicated
"formalistically." (The relationship between formalism and bureauc-
racy is another area the history of which has not yet fully been
written.) The "scientific" principles that are embedded in a science of
society can partially be written into detailed rules that will allow the
judge to operate much like a bureaucrat. That is, he will not be
distracted by the moral significance of the particular events before
him. Indeed, he will be attracted by summary proceedings and
103. Weber was shocked by precisely this vision of modernity: "numbing bureaucracy
administering a society regulated only by considerations of performance and efficiency, the
domination of capital, and the conversion of all human relations and culture into commodities, a
world of enforced conformity and superficial variety." KOLB, supra note 63, at 258.
104. There is a long history of argument, fought out in legal doctrine, about which kinds of
issues can be addressed administratively, either through informal action or agency adjudication,
and which must be adjudicated in a civil court and, if the latter, by jury trial. Both the natural
rights and the republican traditions are in play in this argument as a limitation on instrumental
rationality. See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. OSHA, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936).
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demand rules of materiality that keep him focused on the principle,
discontinuous with ordinary morality, that will decide the case and so
reconstitute the basic structure.
To the extent that we come to put our faith in a science of soci-
ety, or various sciences that exhaust the social field, the jury trial will
continue to be diminished as a public institution. A major issue for
judges and legislators, and also for theorists, is to discern the range of
decisions that we give over to technical and bureaucratic decision
making, as opposed to the more traditional form of evaluation that
occurs at trial. Much of what American corporations say in their ad
campaigns against the trial is a polemical contribution to this debate
on the side of instrumental thinking.
There is a another perspective that does not pitch its tent with
"scientific" thinking, at least not in the Anglo-American usage of that
term, but embraces the conviction that there is a mode of thinking
about the basic structure of society that is superior, at least in some
contexts, to the highly contextual reasoning that occurs in the jury
trial. The doctrine of "constitutional facts," 105 it seems to me, reflects
that view. This perspective suggests that in some contexts, promi-
nently the First Amendment context, the legal significance of the
resolution of the particular case as setting a clear standard to be
applied for action in the future, its "political" significance, if you will,
is of greater importance than the highly contextual resolution of the
particular case. And, more importantly, judges, perhaps especially
appellate judges, and especially Supreme Court justices, are in a
better position to make that judgment than will be the individual jury.
This position, which seems generally plausible, assumes there is a
kind of knowledge of the legal order as a whole that comes from long
and reflective experience within it, a statesman's knowledge. Even
though the discipline of the evidence at trial actualizes a common
sense that is not "plebiscitory," not the least common denominator of
lay understanding, it may not fully reflect all the knowledge that a
legal statesman has.
Judges will continue to work out the areas in which this perspec-
tive is persuasive. In the civil context, it will arise in cases concerning
the appropriateness of summary judgment and the extent of appellate
review of questions of fact. Of course, they are highly interested
parties in this inquiry. But because there is a rich tradition of honor-




ing the passive virtues among the judiciary, of appreciating the limits
of their own competency and authority, we can hope that the jury will
continue to be a vital institution.
There is a third inquiry the results of which will be closely related
to the range of issues we commit to jury decision making in the
future. It is closely related to the inquiry concerning the appropriate
extent of bureaucratic social ordering. It begins with two assertions.
Jury decision making was appropriate, often in the name of higher
law, at a time when (1) there was a high level of moral consensus in
the society and (2) written law could plausibly be understood as an
expression of that moral consensus, not as an expression of technical
judgment. That era is over. Those assertions raise a number of
questions. On a factual level, there are questions concerning the
representativeness of juries and the extent to which people arrive at
the same judgment from different perspectives.1°6 On the theoretical
level, they raise questions about the extent to which common sense
and ordinary morality are relevant to "what the law is" in different
social fields. It seems to me that the actual characteristics of jury
decision making throw considerable light on the basic philosophical
questions about the relationships among law, morality, and politics
that are at play in this inquiry. Our understanding of "what is or is
not law" will undoubtedly affect our understanding of the legitimacy
of jury verdicts in the future. 107 I hope the opposite development
occurs as well, that our understanding of what law is continues to be
enriched by a nuanced understanding of jury decision making. The
polemics surrounding the jury trial and the higher comfort level most
legal philosophers have with appellate opinions rather than jury trials
slow this process down considerably.
In considering these questions, I hope that we remember that the
trial as we have it already provides an important place for the law of
rules and the interests of stability, predictability, and consequent
autonomy that it expresses. I will not rehearse all of the ways in
which that is true. The trial allows the jury to say something other
than stability and predictability are the most important features of
this case, but legal rules in many ways decide which cases go to trial
and structure the cases that juries see. The rule of law is an important
element in American public identity and there is every reason to
106. Only a very small percentage of juries hang. This is especially true for civil juries.
107. See Bums, supra note 100, at 223-30.
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believe that juries take that ideal very seriously. 10 8 And, of course, in
a democratic society it is unlikely that a gap between the law of rules
and the judgment of a cross-sectional jury will be very wide or last too
long. But even when such a gap exists, the value of conforming to the
written law is certainly one that juries appreciate.
I have posed these issues as questions, as if their resolution will
dictate the future of the jury trial. But the jury trial is a real institu-
tion around which real interests rotate. It is possible that these
interests have a dynamic that will diminish its importance. In particu-
lar, an increased bureaucratization of American life and an increased
power of the "systems world" over that life would likely dictate a
reduced place for the mode of case resolution that is largely incom-
patible with the instrumental rationality of bureaucratic entities,
especially as that instrumentalism reaches out to control the political
and administrative process. Again, an imperial-bureaucratic style
may be gaining momentum. These are powerful dynamics, but not
outside our political and legal control.
VII. REFORM
For an institutional conservative like myself, the question of re-
form is delicate. This is especially true with regard to an institution,
the jury trial, whose strength is rooted in a way in which opposing
values are placed in powerful tensions. Those tensions make it the
crucible of democracy. I have spent so much space describing the
jury trial because I agree with that old conservative, Dr. Johnson, who
said that people need to be reminded more often than they need to be
instructed.09 I am not in the same position as the defenders of the
received view, who have a simpler notion of the trial that can serve as
a goal to which reforms may be related instrumentally. Nonetheless,
since part of my topic is the future of the jury trial, I suppose I should
venture a few possibilities in fairly summary form. It seems to me
that they would move in the direction of increasing the quality of
deliberation at trial and so increasing the level of public confidence in
108. The classic finding is that judges said they agree with juries in about 80% of cases.
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 56 (1966). Since judges were
asked how they "would have" decided the case while the jury was deliberating and so knew that
they did not bear the actual responsibility for the decision of the case, it is likely that Kalven and
Zeisel underestimated the extent of judge-jury agreement. See id. at 45. And, of course, there is
the question of the propriety of using the judge's determination as the proxy for "the law."
109. JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON (W. J. Bate ed., Random House
1952)
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the trial.11o I have six suggestions largely with regard to the institu-
tional context within which juries function.
First, the trend to admissibility in the law of evidence should con-
tinue."1 Because most evidence has some probative value and the
jury's decision is one that integrates all the evidence, we should rely
primarily on the critical devices of the trial to enable the jury to
properly evaluate the evidence. Only when those devices are, for one
reason or another, inadequate, should we consider exclusion. In
particular, razor's edge binary decisions by the judge as to the admis-
sibility of important evidence based on whether the proponent has
satisfied a foundational requirement by a preponderance of the
evidence should be disfavored. As one of our most important evi-
dence scholars, who is also a trial court judge of great experience, put
it:
Excluding information on the ground that jurors are too ignorant or
emotional to evaluate it properly may have been appropriate in
England at a time when a rigid class society created a wide gap be-
tween royal judges and commoner jurors, but it is inconsistent with
the realities of our modern American informed society and the re-
sponsibilities of independent thought in a working society."2
The goal of evidence law should be to maintain the productive
tensions that prevail in the trial court. I understand that this is not a
cookbook formula for deciding what evidence serves only to dissipate
those tensions, but I think that some such regulative ideal actually
informs much of the best of the current "discretionary controls in the
hands of a wise and strong trial court."" 3 Concessions to the short-
ness of life and to the inability of some lawyers to present a coherent
case should be exercised through methods that do not require the
micromanaging of evidence, such as reasonable time limitations for
the presentation of evidence.
Second, too much trial by ambush still prevails in the criminal
trial. The almost universal absence of some deposition practice in
serious criminal cases invites false convictions. The use of hearings
on motions to suppress to eke out a bit of discovery in the face of
110. One factor that weakens the trial stems from the market system "within" which it is
embedded. Namely, the unequal distribution of legal resources can be every bit as important as
are features of the trial itself.
111. See Robert P. Burns, Notes on the Future of Evidence Law, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 69 (2001).
112. United States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460, 493 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Weinstein, J.)
(quoting 1 MARGARET A. BERGER ET AL., PREFACE TO EVIDENCE iii (1994)); see Peter W.
Murphy, Some Reflections on Evidence and Proof, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 327 (1999).
113. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 485-86 (1948).
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generally sustained objections is a very poor substitute for real
discovery and serves to corrupt the process.
Third, the limitations on discovery for the criminal defendant are
often justified as providing a rough balance to offset the strategic
advantage of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. The
constitutional structure of privilege law should be rethought with a
more concrete imagination. More focus must be placed on the
situation of the truly innocent. The absence of actual protection at
the police station combined with overblown and ritualistic protection
at trial is likely to benefit the guilty and disfavor the innocent.
114
Fourth, we have to address problems surrounding systematic per-
jury. It is a blight on the trial system, one that leads in criminal cases
to false convictions and false acquittals. This is a difficult matter, and
one that rules may have limited power to correct. Trials would be
better if lawyers were more serious about "confronting" their clients
and witnesses on potential testimony.
Fifth, in the civil context the percentage of litigation time spent
in discovery disputes and in summary judgment practice"5 should
decline. The industry that is built around those enterprises should be
downsized.1 6 This will take continued changes in the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and the economics of
law practice. An attempt to mediate most civil cases should occur
only after crucial discovery is complete. If it is unsuccessful, most
cases should proceed to an early trial.
Sixth, juries should be aware of the consequences of their deci-
sions. Substantive law should provide "remedies" that take account
of the fluidity and ambiguity of life. This is less a problem in civil
cases where juries determine money damages. In criminal cases
enormous sentencing differentials, from probation to death, can
depend on determination about "facts" concerning mental states that
are written on water. A greater continuum of possible penalties in
the jury's hands is likely to produce fairer outcomes.
With regard to the trial itself, I would endorse the suggestions re-
cently made by Jeffrey Abramson. " 7 Abramson recommends that the
114. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1978).
115. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of
Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 192-93
(1988).
116. See George B. Shepherd & Morgan Cloud, Time and Money: Discovery Leads to
Hourly Billing, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 91,112.
117. ABRAMSON, supra note 12, at 247-50.
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unanimous verdict should be reinstated, the peremptory challenge
should be eliminated, that juries be instructed that they have the
authority to set aside the written law to acquit a defendant, that the
practice end of routinely disqualifying potential jurors because of
exposure to the standard kinds of pretrial publicity, and that citizens
not be so easily able to escape their jury obligations." 8 The unanimity
requirement will improve deliberation at the cost of a few more hung
juries. The elimination of the peremptory challenge would reduce the
uncertainties, some of them corrupting, surrounding the courts'
attempts to enforce Batson 19 and its progeny. Eliminating perempto-
ries should be accompanied by a more serious reconsideration of
what constitutes "cause" for excluding a juror. Because of the
availability of peremptories, many judges have stopped granting all
but the most obvious motions to strike jurors for cause. The spectacle
of jury selection that takes as long as the trial itself should end.
Nullification is rarely employed, but is alive and well. The instruction
that juries have the authority to be "judges of the law" in criminal
cases could be accompanied by instructions that they are to exercise
this authority cautiously. "One day or one trial" systems that are
currently used in many places will be strengthened by elimination of
peremptories. It will increase the likelihood that citizens who appear
for jury duty will actually serve, and reduce the need to assemble
citizens who are then sent home.
Although I am not at all sure anything will come of it, I would
like to see a sustained attempt by social psychologists and other social
scientists to identify those systematic failures in human cognitive
capacities in which there is the highest level of certainty in the scien-
tific community and which pose special dangers of distorting jury
reasoning. As the above shows, I am a strong defender of the power
of the jury's common sense, when disciplined by the trial's devices.
However, we already instruct jurors about what is fair to consider in
weighing evidence. Jurors are, for example, told they should consider
a witness's interests, demeanor, and any prior inconsistent statements
a witness has made in assessing credibility. They are told about the
significance they may or should attach to a witness's failure to pro-
duce evidence within his or her control. As with the exclusionary
rules of the law of evidence, there is precious little empirical evidence
to support these instructions about how to consider evidence. I can
118. Id.
119. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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imagine a day when judges provide jurors instructions identifying the
circumstances under which we know that eyewitness identifications or
confessions are especially likely to be unreliable. I understand that
this is a delicate enterprise, but it has some chance of helping jury
deliberations.
CONCLUSION
The American jury trial, as it currently exists, is one of the great-
est achievements of our public culture. It is surrounded by rules and
practices that elevate the jury's common sense. It is the crucible of
democracy, one of our most important defenses against the onslaught
of modernity. Its power stems from the sharp tension of opposites
from which it is built up. A decent regard for our own traditions
suggests that we consider seriously the profoundly conservative words
of the Supreme Court in Michelson v. United States: "To pull one
misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely simply
to upset its present balance between adverse interests than establish a
rational edifice. ' 120 And, of course, those words apply to my own
modest suggestions for what may or may not prove to be "reform."
120. 335 U.S. 469, 485-86 (1948). The Court was discussing evidence law, which was then
more grotesque than it is now, and much more grotesque than the structure of the trial as a
whole.
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